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Abstract
The conservative asymmetry of elite polarization represents a significant puzzle. We ar-
gue that politicians can maintain systematic misperceptions of constituency opinion that may
contribute to such breakdowns in dyadic representation. We demonstrate this argument with
original surveys of 3,765 politicians’ perceptions of constituency opinion on nine issues. In
2012 and 2014, politicians of both parties dramatically overestimated their constituents’ sup-
port for conservative policies on these issues, a pattern consistent across methods, districts,
and states. We also show Republicans drive much of this overestimation. Exploiting responses
from politicians in the same district, we confirm these partisan differences within individual
districts. Further evidence suggests that this overestimation may arise due to biases in who con-
tacts politicians, as in recent years Republican citizens have been especially likely to contact
legislators, especially fellow Republicans. Our findings suggest a novel force can operate in
elections and in legislatures: politicians can systematically misperceive what their constituents
want.
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The sharp increase in elite polarization has been called “the central puzzle of modern Ameri-
can politics” (Poole 2004).1 Increasingly, scholars hold that polarization is asymmetric, with “the
movement of the Republican Party to the right account[ing] for most” of polarization (McCarty
2015).2 For example, Ahler and Broockman (2017) find that in the years 2008-2016, Democratic
Members of the US House voted with the majority of their constituents 69% of the time on roll calls
the CCES asked about, whereas Republican Members did so only 52% of the time, barely more
often than would be expected by chance. Similarly, Hall (2015, Table A.4) finds that Republican
candidates often take positions more extreme than would be electorally optimal, while Democrats
do so far less. Scholars have worked to understand how politicians’ congruence with public opin-
ion can break down from many perspectives (Achen and Bartels 2016; Bawn et al. 2012; Gilens
2012), but existing theories still struggle to explain such one-sided biases.
In this paper, we argue that politicians can misperceive constituency opinion dramatically and
systematically enough to contribute to significant, one-sided biases in representation such as asym-
metric polarization. Existing evidence establishes that politicians want to be congruent with con-
stituency opinion, as they change their behavior when they learn more about it (Bergan 2009;
Butler and Nickerson 2011). This evidence is consistent with canonical theories that politicians
seek to represent the median voter (e.g., Downs 1957) and empirical findings demonstrating politi-
cians’ strong responsiveness to public opinion (e.g., Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002; Erikson
2013). However, classic theories of representation argue that politicians’ information environments
can leave them imperfectly informed about the median voter’s preferences: “the constituency that a
representative reacts to is the constituency that he or she sees” (Fenno 1977, p. 883) but “The Rep-
resentative knows his constituents mostly from dealing with people who do write letters [and] who
will attend meetings” (Miller and Stokes 1963, see also Butler and Dynes (2016); Miler (2010)).
Extending these theories, we argue that biases in politicians’ information environments common
across politicians can lead politicians as a whole to systematically misperceive constituency opin-
1Quoted in Fiorina and Levendusky (2006).
2See also, among others, Grossmann and Hopkins (2015, 2016); Hacker and Pierson (2005, 2015); Mann and Ornstein
(2013); McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006); Theriault (2013). This view is by no means universal, but is currently
accepted as conventional wisdom among many scholars. See Online Appendix B for review.
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ion and, in turn, to contribute to systemic breakdowns in dyadic representation like asymmetric
polarization.
We demonstrate our argument in the context of the contemporary United States, where con-
ditions for bias in politicians’ perceptions of constituency opinion appear ripe. Over the last few
decades, and especially during the last decade, actors on the political right built the capacity to
“rapidly mobilize large numbers” of conservative citizens to participate in the public spheres rep-
resentatives monitor (Blee and Creasap 2010) by organizing intense conservative issue publics,
coordinating with talk radio programs, and more (Goss 2008; Fang 2013). During the Obama pres-
idency, these forces and “thermostatic” (Wlezien 1995) reactions pushed right-wing activism to
new heights (Skocpol and Williamson 2011; Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez 2016). For example,
while voter turnout for conservatives and liberals differs only slightly,3 conservatives have recently
been significantly more likely to participate in the public sphere in other ways, such as by contact-
ing their legislators or attending town hall meetings. These differences are not small: for example,
in the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study Republican citizens were 39% more likely
than Democrats to indicate they had contacted their US House Member’s office to express their
opinion, differences that persisted in 2012 but were not evident in previous decades (see Table
A1). The explicit goal of much of conservatives’ participation in the public sphere is to shape how
politicians perceive the public’s demands (e.g., MacGuffie 2009).
In contexts like these, can politicians indeed systematically misperceive constituency opinion
on salient issues? To shed light on this question, we gathered one of the most extensive documen-
tations of elite perceptions of constituency opinion ever compiled. This original survey evidence
spans two years and 3,765 surveys of American politicians, across which we collected 11,803 elite
perceptions of constituency opinion in total. Our main evidence comes from a survey we conducted
in 2014 of 1,858 state politicians, motivated by evidence that the same dynamics persist at the state
level and by the variation available there. Further, motivated by evidence that polarization is partly
a function of newly elected candidates taking more extreme positions than their predecessors (The-
3Later in the paper, we show that voters and non-voters have nearly identical average opinions on the issues we study.
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riault 2006), we surveyed both incumbents and candidates. We measured these officeholders’ and
candidates’ perceptions of public opinion in their districts across seven issues in total. We then
compared these politicians’ perceptions of opinion in their constituencies to estimates of actual
opinion there, which we computed using Cooperative Congressional Election Study data, to exam-
ine whether their politicians’ perceptions were significantly or systematically distorted. We also
present data from a pilot study we conducted in 2012.
Our evidence reveals that, on average, American politicians from both parties in 2012 and 2014
believed that support for conservative positions on these issues in their constituencies was much
higher than it actually was. These misperceptions are large, pervasive, and robust: politicians’ right-
skewed misperceptions exceed 20 percentage points on issues such as gun control and persist in
states at every level of legislative professionalism, among both candidates and sitting officeholders,
among politicians in very competitive districts, and when we compare politicians’ perceptions to
voters’ opinions only. That Democratic politicians also overestimate constituency conservatism
suggests these misperceptions cannot be attributed to motivated reasoning or social desirability
bias alone.
Why are US politicians’ perceptions of constituency opinion systematically skewed to the
right? We present additional evidence that suggests a potential mechanism consistent with politi-
cians’ information environments playing a role (Miller and Stokes 1963). Not only are Republican
citizens more likely to voice their views to politicians in general, but we show that Republican
citizens are especially likely to express their views to politicians who are fellow Republicans. This
means that whereas Democratic politicians hear from Republican constituents somewhat dispro-
portionately, Republican politicians appear to hear from Republican constituents very dispropor-
tionately. Consistent with this mechanism, we show that much (although not all) of the conservative
misperceptions we found are driven by Republican politicians. Online Appendix H finds sugges-
tive evidence that the strength of the partisan imbalance in contact from constituents also correlates
with the extent to which politicians overestimate conservatism. We also find in Online Appendix
I that in earlier eras when there was less asymmetry in partisan participation, politicians did not
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appear to exhibit the same asymmetric misperceptions. Although direct contact with legislators is
just one of many asymmetries in citizens’ public engagement that could skew politicians’ percep-
tions of constituency opinion, these patterns suggest that direct contact and the other participatory
behaviors it proxies for may play an important role.
Consistent with our theoretical argument, these biases in politicians’ perceptions of constituency
opinion are pervasive enough and considerable enough in magnitude to plausibly contribute to a
phenomena like asymmetric polarization. For example, we find that even in districts where majori-
ties of constituents favor same-sex marriage, Republican politicians in these districts perceive their
constituents as opposed to same-sex marriage by 3-to-1 on average. Such misperceptions may help
explain the puzzle of why so many politicians remain opposed to same-sex marriage even when
their constituents favor it (Krimmel, Lax and Phillips 2016).
In concluding we discuss several additional empirical predictions of our theory that are con-
firmed in other evidence. However, our argument readily allows that US politicians’ misperceptions
of constituency opinion could change in magnitude or even in direction—such as in response to
protest in the wake of the Trump presidency—and that such changes would have important im-
plications. We also discuss several broader implications of our argument and directions for future
research. In terms of immediate implications for theories of democratic responsiveness, our find-
ings present a mixed verdict. On the one hand, we find very strong responsiveness of politicians’
perceptions of constituents’ opinions to that opinion (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002). The
correlations between public opinion and politicians’ perceptions of it we find are strong. However,
this robust responsiveness belies often large gaps in congruence between opinion and perceptions
(Achen 1978): politicians’ perceptions are offset by an “intercept shift” that leads them to often
misperceive majority will.4 This is consistent with a more nuanced understanding of the relation-
ship between public opinion and public policy (Lax and Phillips 2012). Future research can and
should further explore what gives rise to politicians’ misperceptions of public opinion, what deter-
mines variation in them, and what consequences they have.
4Achen (1978) terms this concept “centrism.”
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Theoretical Perspectives
Politicians’ positions and the policies they make are clearly responsive to public opinion (e.g.,
Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002; Erikson 2013; Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014), but they
are not perfectly congruent with it (e.g., Lax and Phillips 2012). For example, the United States
has recently witnessed a sharp increase in asymemtric polarization, wherein Republican politicians
take positions that are more extreme than their Democratic counterparts on many issues (see Online
Appendix B for review). What contributes to major biases in democratic representation like this?
Existing explanations for phenomena such as asymmetric polarization largely focus on reasons
why politicians might have electoral incentives to diverge from the preferences of the median
voter (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006; Hacker and Pierson 2005). These explanations are
compelling, but may offer incomplete explanations in some cases. For example, evidence indicates
that Republican politicians are even more polarized than would be electorally optimal (Hall 2015;
Hall and Snyder 2015; Jacobson 2013).
Classic theories of representation suggest another hypothesis: that politicians may not accu-
rately perceive what their constituents want. These theories argue that although politicians prefer
to remain in step with prevailing constituency opinion, they have incomplete information about it
and so must rely on imperfect cues (Arnold 1990; Fenno 1977; Kingdon 1967; Miller and Stokes
1963), which they cognitively process with classic behavioral biases (Butler and Dynes 2016;
Miler 2010). Consistent with these theories, field experiments show that even a few dozen calls
from constituents or one poll about constituency opinion can change how legislators vote (Bergan
2009; Bergan and Cole 2015; Butler and Nickerson 2011). Evidence from natural experiments,
elite survey experiments, elite interviews, and descriptive data support these same conclusions.5
In this paper, we extend these theories to consider their potential consequences for aggregate
representation. In particular, we argue that systematic biases in politicians’ information environ-
5See Berinsky and Lenz (2014); Druckman and Jacobs (2006); Enos and Hersh (2015); Henderson and Brooks (2016);
Jacobs and Shapiro (1995). For example, Druckman and Jacobs (2006) and Jacobs and Shapiro (1995) find that
politicians are highly attuned to public opinion data when they do have access to it, although are constrained in the
amount of public opinion data to which they do have access.
5
ments common across politicians could generate significant, widespread biases in their perceptions
of their geographic constituencies.6
Influential arguments hold that even if politicians do misperceive constituency opinion, such
errors will be generally random and cancel out among the collective (Weissberg 1978). However,
we argue that forces that bias politicians’ perceptions of public opinion can be common across
many politicians, leading politicians as a whole to hold systematic misperceptions of their con-
stituents. For example, if certain kinds of individuals are more likely to express their views in
the public spheres politicians monitor, these individuals’ viewpoints may loom disproportionately
large in many politicians’ minds as they think about what their geographic constituency wants.7
If the same kinds of individuals are more active, vocal, and intense across districts, political elites
may systematically misperceive public opinion in similar ways, leading to significant biases in
aggregate representation like asymmetric polarization.
Over the last several decades, and in the last decade in particular, the conditions for just this
kind of systematic bias in politicians’ perceptions have been ripe in American politics. During
this time, conservative actors have focused on cultivating active issue publics on the right and
building the infrastructure to mobilize them to participate in the public sphere (Blee and Creasap
2010). A number of scholars have noted that this organized base of conservative groups and vot-
ers have tailored their strategies to influence how politicians perceive their constituents’ demands
(Goss 2008; Hacker and Pierson 2005, 2015; Skocpol and Williamson 2011; Skocpol and Hertel-
Fernandez 2016). For example, intending to create the impression that legislators’ constituencies
were strongly opposed to Barack Obama’s legislative proposals in 2009, organizations affiliated
with the Tea Party famously surrounded politicians with conservative constituents voicing strenu-
6Fenno (1977) defines the geographic constituency as those residing in politicians’ legal district boundaries: “[the
geographic constituency] includes the entire population within those boundaries” (p. 884).
7For example, when politicians think about what their constituents as a whole want, copartisans, primary voters, and
the constituents and groups who are more active, vocal, and intense may be more likely to come to mind (Miler 2010),
classic examples of the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1973).
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ous opposition at town halls.8
The famous ‘Tea Party Town Hall Strategy’ is just one manifestation of a broader strategy
conservative groups and voters have pursued to convince politicians that their constituencies favor
conservative policies. For example, journalistic accounts detail how conservative advocacy groups,
talk radio hosts, and donors have developed networks and organizations that ensure conservative
citizens regularly make politicians hear their voices at town halls, by phone, and otherwise (Fang
2013). Such activity has been in a renaissance on the political right, buoyed in part by a backlash
to waves of left-leaning policymaking (such as during the Obama era) and conservative national
donors’ rising incomes (Blee and Creasap 2010). Meanwhile, its left-wing equivalents have at-
rophied, with unions in decline (Goss 2008; Hacker and Pierson 2005; Skocpol and Williamson
2011).
Theoretically, our argument predicts that these nationwide efforts to make politicians ‘feel the
heat’ from conservative constituents during the last decade could have pushed politicians’ collec-
tive perceptions of their geographic constituencies to the right, and their positions to the right in
turn. This would likely exacerbate asymmetric polarization by slowing Democrats’ leftward moves
and hastening Republicans’ rightward trajectory.
With this said, it is by no means obvious that such activity would actually bias politicians’
perceptions of public opinion pervasively and dramatically enough to contribute to these significant
biases in representation. Politicians may well appreciate that the people who call their offices,
attend town hall meetings, write letters to the editor, etc. are unrepresentative.
Unfortunately, despite the central role of politicians’ perceptions of public opinion in canonical
and contemporary theories, little data on them exists today. Querying politicians’ perceptions of
8A strategy memo from one such group recounted that their “objective was to ‘pack the hall”’ at their member’s
town hall event and recommended that similar groups be sure their representatives “be made to feel that a major-
ity...opposes” Obama’s agenda. Consistent with these efforts to shape politicians’ perceptions of their constituency,
this group also released a press release claiming that “there are tens of thousands” of other constituents “who agree
with us” (MacGuffie 2009).
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opinion was an active area of empirical research in American politics in the 1960s and 1970s,9
but these classic studies had very small sample sizes and few recent studies have engaged these
questions.10 Much has changed since the 1960s and 1970s, however, including dramatic changes
to how politicians communicate with and hear from their constituencies.
In this paper, motivated by the theoretical puzzle of why representation can sometimes break
down, we present the results of an extensive data collection effort we undertook to shed new light
on what contemporary American politicians believe about public opinion among their constituents.
To do so, we leverage technological changes since studies like Miller and Stokes (1963) to examine
how politicians perceive their constituents with greater precision and across more issues than was
previously possible. We measure these perceptions in the context of state politics, where asym-
metric polarization generally persists (Shor 2015) but where variation gives us leverage to test
alternative explanations and secondary hypotheses.
Data: The 2014 National Candidate Study
To measure state politicians’ perceptions of public opinion, we conducted the 2014 National
Candidate Study (NCS), an original combined online and mail survey of sitting state legislators
and candidates running for state legislature in the 2014 fielded in October of that year.
To build the sampling frame of candidates running for state legislature and sitting state legis-
lators running for re-election, we obtained their names and contact information from Project Vote
Smart, which maintains a comprehensive database of candidates for office nationwide, and invited
9Miller and Stokes (1963) conducted one of the first systematic investigations of how politicians see their constituents,
and other scholars in the 1960s and 1970s followed in Miller and Stokes’s (1963) footsteps (e.g., Kuklinski and Elling
1977; Uslaner and Weber 1979; Hedlund and Friesema 1972).
10One prominent example is the structured interviews conducted by Miler (2010), who finds that legislators and their
staff generally think of their constituencies in a fragmented and inaccurate way, recalling only a small subset of
relevant constituencies on any given topic.
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all candidates by both mail and email if possible.11 1,803 candidates responded12 for an overall
response rate of 20.8%, substantially higher than most elite surveys and surveys of the general
public. 950 of the respondents won their general election and took seats in state legislatures in
2015. 685 already held office. Importantly, the NCS was designed to minimize the chance of staff
responding to the survey instead of politicians themselves.13
We also conducted a similar survey in 2012, described in Online Appendix C, which we discuss
later in the paper to establish the generalizability of our results across election types and issue areas.
Representativeness
The politicians who responded to the 2014 NCS were broadly representative of the overall pop-
ulation of general election candidates for state legislative offices. Figure 1 plots the distributions
of Obama’s share of the 2012 two-party vote in each politician’s district and Squire’s (2007) mea-
sure of state legislative professionalism, with separate density plots for the entire sampling frame
of candidates for office and for just the politicians who responded to the NCS. The left column
displays the distributions of districts with and without a Democratic respondent, while the right
column displays the same for Republican respondents. There are no major differences that would
suggest that our respondents from either party are unrepresentative of the broader population of
state legislative districts. Online Appendix D provides additional representativeness assessments.
11We selected legislators in states that had elections in 2014 (all states except Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, and
Virginia). Our analysis excludes respondents from New Hampshire’s House floterial districts, who cannot be easily
matched to Census geographies. We collected mailing addresses and email addresses for each candidate from Project
Vote Smart, restricting our sample to major party candidates. Many candidates had both forms of contact information
available and almost all had at least one form. Of the 8,965 candidates listed as running, 8,858 candidates had a
mailing address available and 4,775 candidates had an email address available. In early October, all candidates for
whom we had a mailing address on file received a postcard announcing the survey. Candidates with email addresses
on file then received three email invitations over the course of about three weeks. In mid-October, all candidates with
mailing addresses on file who had not already taken the online version of the survey received a paper copy of the
survey that they had the opportunity to mail back to us.
121,175 responded to the email solicitation, 84 responded online after receiving the mail version, and 610 returned the
paper version of the survey, for a total sample size of 1,803 politicians.
13In particular, the online version of the survey had a screener question that shut down the survey if the respondent did
not report personally being a candidate. The paper version of the survey also included this screener question, with
bold text that said that the survey was only for candidates. Also, where multiple email or mailing addresses were
available in the Project Vote Smart database, we chose the ones most likely to be the candidate’s home address or
personal email as opposed to campaign office addresses.
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There we find that Democrats and non-incumbents were slightly more likely to respond, and so
later in the paper we show the results separated by party and incumbency status. We do not find
any differences between response rates for those who were running for upper or lower legislative
chambers. There we also give the question wording for the questions we asked about candidates’
ideology and the number of polls they took.
Figure 1: Representativeness of politicians who responded, by party, presidential vote share in the
district, and state legislative professionalization.
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Issues and Instrumentation
In order to compare elites’ perceptions to reasonably precise estimates of true public opinion,
we asked them to estimate constituency opinion on items that were being contemporaneously asked
in the 2014 CCES, a large sample survey (N = 56, 200) (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2015). We
were therefore constrained in the kinds of issues we could ask about, as the CCES only asked the
full public sample about their opinions on a limited set of issues. However, the CCES had several
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issue items that corresponded well to debates that were highly publicly salient in states during this
period, including debates over same-sex marriage, gun control, immigration,14 and abortion. Most
of these are relatively salient, “easy” issues where public opinion has remained relatively stable,
so we expected politicians to be especially likely to have accurate estimates of them. (Later we
present data from a pilot study in 2012 that has two economic issues.)
In Table 1 we report the specific CCES items we asked politicians to estimate. We also re-
port the national level of support among opinion holders from the 2014 CCES, using the weights
provided by the CCES, and among voters the CCES validated to have ultimately voted in 2014.
We also report whether a response of “Yes” to the issue question reflects a conservative or liberal
preference, and whether the issue question would reflect a change in the status quo at the national
level. As Table 1 indicates, the issue questions we chose vary along these dimensions. This was a
deliberate choice: we wanted a mix of popular, unpopular, and controversial policy statements to
avoid ceiling or floor effects in politicians’ estimates of opinion. We did not always want a “Yes”
response to the survey question to represent a particular ideological direction, nor did we want all
of the questions to represent a status quo change. We were, however, constrained to issues covered
in the common content of the CCES, the only publicly available survey with a sample size large
enough for our purpose.15 Online Appendix E shows that the national means on the CCES to these
items are similar to the national means for similar items on other surveys, suggesting representa-
tiveness issues with the CCES are unlikely to have spuriously generated our main findings.16
Following Warshaw and Rodden (2012), CCES respondents are matched to state legislative
districts using their ZIP code and their race. Nearly all respondents are matched to districts with
certainty, although to avoid biases from dropping respondents, we conduct a full join and weight
14Even though much immigration policy is inherently a federal issue, states faced numerous questions during this
period about whether to extend ‘sanctuary’ status to undocumented immigrants, whether to allow immigrants to get
driver’s licenses, etc. One of our immigration items closely aligns with the hotly contested debate over Arizona’s
SB1070.
15Recent high-profile errors of national and state polls in American politics provide some caution about interpreting
these results, but we will show that the magnitude of the differences between CCES-measured opinion and politi-
cians’ perceptions of this opinion will be many times larger than these errors.
16Our findings that many liberal policies are popular in many districts is broadly consistent with Ellis and Stimson
(2012), who find that Americans tend to have liberal views on specific policies.
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Table 1: Issue questions from the 2014 National Candidate Study, with weighted national levels of
support from the CCES.
National Mean Among ‘Yes’ Status quo
Issue Item Wording Mean 2014 Voters direction change?
“Allow gays and lesbians to marry
legally.”
56% 54% Liberal Some states
“Let employers and insurers refuse
to cover birth control and other
health services that violate their re-
ligious beliefs.”
43% 47% Conservative No
“Require background checks for all
gun sales, including at gun shows
and over the Internet.”
87% 86% Liberal Yes
“Ban assault rifles.” 61% 60% Liberal Yes
“Allow police to question anyone
they think may be in the country il-
legally.”
37% 41% Conservative Yes
“Grant legal status to all illegal im-
migrants who have held jobs and
paid taxes for at least 3 years, and
not been convicted of any felony
crimes.”
47% 46% Liberal Yes
“Always allow a woman to obtain
an abortion as a matter of choice.”
57% 54% Liberal Yes
observations based on the certainty with which they are matched.17
To examine politicians’ beliefs about the districts in which they were running, the NCS asked
each politician to estimate, “What percent of the people living in your district would agree with
the following statements?” before providing a subsample of the items in Table 1 with essentially
17We use the Missouri Census Data Center’s MABLE/Geocorr tool to match zip codes to state legislative districts.
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the exact same wordings that appeared on the 2014 CCES.18 We chose this question wording to
measure political elites’ perceptions of their geographic constituency’s opinion because it most
closely maps to the theoretical puzzle that motivated our study, asymmetric polarization, which
makes important observations about median constituency opinion. In addition, it is possible to
objectively measure the correct answer to this question.19
Politicians’ Perceptions of Constituency Opinion
We use two empirical strategies to examine the accuracy of politicians’ perceptions of their
districts. Our first strategy is to estimate a grand (weighted) mean of opinion across all districts
where politicians responded and compare this to the mean of their perceptions. Our second strategy
is to compute estimates of opinion in each district using MRP. Neither of these approaches rely on
us having completely accurate estimates of of public opinion in any particular district; rather, we
rely on average differences across districts. Moreover, although each of these approaches entails
differing assumptions, they ultimately yield highly similar conclusions.
Empirical Strategy 1: Raw Data
For our first approach, we compare the average of politicians’ perceptions across all the dis-
tricts where politicians responded to the CCES estimate of public opinion across all the districts
where politicians responded. Our estimation strategy is as follows. Let C represent the set of all
CCES respondents who live in districts where a politician responded to our survey, with CCES
18Table A4 shows the wording of the NCS items we used to query politicians’ perceptions, as also shown in Table 1,
alongside the wording for the original items on the CCES. As can be seen, we constructed the item wordings to be
essentially identical. All elite respondents were shown the first two items, about same-sex marriage and birth control
exemptions. Respondents were randomly assigned one of the two items about gun control, one of the two items
about immigration, and one of two items about abortion, such that each respondent made five total estimates. One of
the abortion items was dropped from our analysis, as described in the Online Appendix.
19We also could have also asked politicians to estimate opinion among ‘subconstituencies’ beyond their geographic
constituency, such as among those who care most about an issue, among fellow partisans, or among other groups
(Fenno 1977). We would encourage further research to add to our findings by doing so. We believe politicians’
perceptions of public opinion within such subconstituencies are also important; focusing on overall opinion in politi-
cians’ geographic constituencies simply represents a starting point given our particular theory and motivation.
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respondents indexed by c and issues by i. Denote opinions expressed on issue i by CCES respon-
dent c as oc,i. All the CCES questions we use are binary choice, such that oc,i 2 {0, 1}. Let pc,i
represent the perception of the politician in c’s district of average support for issue i; that is, pc,i is
a politician’s estimate of E(oc,i) for their district. The average of pc,i oc,i within each district thus
represents an estimate of politicians’ average overestimation of support for policy i. For example,
suppose a politician perceives support for a policy in their district at 80% but true support is only
60%. In this example, E(pc,i   oc,i) = 0.8   E(oc,i) = 0.8   0.6 = 0.2. To estimate politicians’
average overestimation of support for issue i, we estimate the mean of pc,i   oc,i across all the
CCES respondents.20 To incorporate the CCES sampling weights, we take the weighted mean of
this quantity, multiplying by the CCES weights wc, which have mean 1. In addition, because the
CCES has many more respondents from larger districts than smaller districts, we weight these es-
timates inversely to district size so that politicians from large districts and small districts matter
equally. In particular, we weight each CCES observation by s¯csc , where sc is the size of each CCES
respondents’ district in 2014 according to the US Census. This makes politicians the effective unit
of analysis and counts politicians from small and large districts equally. Our results are similar
regardless of the weighting approach we use, however.
Given this setup, politicians’ mean perception can be estimated with:
b¯pi =
X
c2C

pc,iwc ⇤ s¯c
sc
 
n(C)
⇡ p¯i, (1)
where n(C) is the number of CCES respondents. We can estimate public opinion in the av-
erage district – what politicians’ average perceptions would be if their perceptions were perfectly
accurate – using:
20We acknowledge Doug Rivers for this suggestion.
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c¯oc,i =
X
c2C

oc,iwc ⇤ s¯c
sc
 
n(C)
. (2)
This quantity can be interpreted as ‘the expectation of district opinion in the district of a politi-
cian who responded chosen at random.’
Ultimately, we seek to estimate y¯i, politicians’ average overestimation of district support for
issue i:
b¯yi =
X
c2C

(pc,i   oc,i)wc ⇤ s¯c
sc
 
n(C)
. (3)
The standard errors of our estimates of each of these quantities are cluster bootstrapped, with
clustering at the district level for politicians and misperceptions and at the respondent level for
public opinion.
Figure 2 and Table 2 show the results of this approach. For example, when it comes to the issue
of same-sex marriage, we estimate that 56.6% of residents of the ‘average district’ supported same-
sex marriage, whereas NCS respondents on average perceived their districts as 49.6% supportive,
meaning they on average overestimated opposition to same-sex marriage by about 7 percentage
points. Elites likewise overestimate the percentage of the public that supports conservative policy
positions across all the other policies. Politicians’ overestimation of conservatism is even larger on
other issues, with a maximum of about 36 percentage points for the issue of background checks
for guns — one of the issues where previous research indicates conservative constituents are the
most well-organized and likely to participate in the public sphere (Goss 2008).
Later in the paper we also conduct this analysis for only incumbents, for only candidates who
won their elections, for only candidates in very close and competitive districts, and for only those
15
Figure 2: Politicians’ perceptions of district opinion and true district opinion
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who ran in states with professionalized legislatures. The results are unchanged, suggesting that
these results are not an artifact of responses from unserious candidates who went on to lose.
Empirical Strategy 2: MRP
We gain additional inferential leverage on the relationship between politicians’ perceptions
and true geographic constituency opinion by estimating support for each issue in all of the na-
tion’s state legislative districts using multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP) (Eggers
and Lauderdale 2016; Hanretty, Lauderdale and Vivyan 2016; Lax and Phillips 2009a,b, 2012;
Park, Gelman and Bafumi 2004; Warshaw and Rodden 2012). This facilitates more nuanced dyadic
comparisons of politicians’ perceptions and estimates of opinion in their specific districts, in addi-
tion to illustrating the robustness of our results to any concerns with the raw data analysis. More
details on our MRP procedure are in Online Appendix F. There we also present robustness checks
and estimates of uncertainty. MRP uses individual-level survey data and demographic information
about the districts from the US Census to construct district-level estimates of support for each
16
Table 2: Raw data estimates of politicians’ perceptions, true district opinion, and politicians’ mis-
perceptions
Actual Public Elite Average
Issue Opinion Perception Misperception
2014 Politicians - Liberal Policies
Same-sex marriage 56.63 49.60 -7.03***
(0.89) (0.63) (0.91)
Ban assault rifles 57.47 38.95 -18.46***
(1.14) (0.93) (1.32)
Background checks for guns 84.30 48.48 -35.79***
(1.08) (1.00) (1.34)
Amnesty for undocumented immigrants 45.85 37.16 -8.69***
(1.13) (0.76) (1.14)
Abortion always legal 55.31 46.04 -9.28***
(1.26) (0.90) (1.29)
2014 Politicians - Conservative Policies
Question suspected undoc. immig. 38.16 50.13 11.97***
(1.15) (0.89) (1.31)
Birth control religious exemptions 43.55 47.07 3.57***
(0.92) (0.65) (0.95)
*** = p < 0.001. ** = p < 0.01. * = p < 0.05. Notes: Standard errors are cluster bootstrapped
at the CCES respondent level for public opinion and at the district level for elite perceptions and
for misperceptions.
issue. Our MRP procedure first fits multilevel choice models to the responses to each issue ques-
tion from the 2014 CCES. Each model returns estimated effects for demographic and geographic
predictors. We then use the estimates from the multilevel model to estimate support for various
demographic cells, identified by age, race, education, gender and district. Finally, using data from
the US Census’ American Community Survey, we weight those cells by their frequency in each
district. The result is an estimate of the percent of each district supporting each issue. We then
matched these estimates for each district with politicians’ perceptions of that district.
Figure 3 shows the result. Each panel of Figure 3 shows the results for one issue. In each panel,
we show how politicians’ perceptions of public opinion on that issue vary as a function of the MRP
estimate of true public opinion on that issue in their district. The y-axis in each panel represents
politicians’ estimates of support in their districts and the x-axis shows the MRP estimates of public
17
Figure 3: Politicians’ perceptions of district opinion as a function of MRP estimates of district
opinion.
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Notes: The black line represents y = x, or how politicians would have responded on average if they were perfectly
accurate.
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opinion in these same districts. Each point on the graph represents one politician’s response. The
striated bands of responses reflect that politicians usually answered in increments of 5 percentage
points. Loess smoothers summarize the average of politicians’ perceptions in each district as a
function of the MRP estimate of district support. The straight black line represents the function y =
x, where politicians would have answered on average were they perfectly accurate.21 For simplicity,
we organize the figures by first presenting questions where higher values of support reflect a liberal
position, then questions where higher values of support reflect a conservative position.
Figure 3 vividly illustrates the nuanced nature of our findings for democratic responsiveness.
On the one hand, politicians are strongly responsive to public opinion, in the sense that there is a
strong and strikingly linear relationship between our estimates of reality and their perceptions.22
Yet, there is a substantial “intercept shift” in every panel in Figure 3, such that politicians substan-
tially overestimate support for conservative positions and underestimate support for liberal ones.
Such misperceptions are unlikely to disappear in aggregate, unlike simple random errors in indi-
vidual politicians’ perceptions would (Weissberg 1978).
The magnitude of these shifts corresponds well with the point estimates from the raw data
approach. As before, these elites are especially inaccurate on the gun control policies, which com-
mand broad support across districts. Indeed, we estimate that banning assault rifles has majority
support in almost all districts and that support for background checks is over 70 percent in all
districts, despite the fact that most politicians perceive the public as fairly evenly divided or even
opposed to these measures. Appendix F.3 also presents 95% confidence intervals for the size of
politicians’ errors and their overestimation of conservatism as calculated on the basis of the MRP
estimates; these intervals are similar in width to the 95% confidence intervals of the raw data esti-
mates.
21Given sampling variability in the MRP estimate we would not expect politicians’ responses to match the MRP
estimates exactly, but we would expect the averages to align.
22The correlations between our perception estimates and theMRP estimates are also strong, although these correlations
are not straightforward to interpret for several reasons, including that they are likely to be biased downward by
sampling error in our public opinion estimates (Achen 1977).
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Robustness Across Election Types and Issues: Pilot Study in 2012
We next present data from a pilot study we conducted in 2012 that speaks to the robustness of
our findings in two ways: it included data on two additional economic issues and was conducted in
a presidential election year. Further information on this sample is in Online Appendix C.23
In this 2012 pilot study we asked candidates running for state legislature to estimate district
support for three issues in their districts: same-sex marriage, universal healthcare, and abolishing
all federal welfare programs. Table A3 presents question wording and weighted national support
for these three issues.
Our measures of public opinion on these issues come from different years of the CCES, de-
termined by question availability. This introduces two main weaknesses we hasten to note. First,
the closest healthcare question on the CCES was four years old and not an exact wording match,
a question on the 2008 CCES which also included the phrase “even if it means raising taxes.”24
Second, the question about all federal welfare programs only appeared on a (random) subsample
of the CCES and only two years prior, in 2010.
Encouragingly for the robustness of the conclusions in the main data, we see similar patterns
in the 2012 pilot data. In particular, Figure A1 and Table 3 show candidates’ average perceptions
of public opinion on these three issues and the CCES estimates of public support in the ‘average
district.’ We consistently find that they overestimate support for conservative positions by between
11 and 22 percentage points. For example, on the question of whether to abolish all federal welfare
programs—an extreme conservative policy that very few Americans favor—support in the average
district is approximately 9%, but politicians perceive it to be many times that, at almost 32%.25
23In general, the 2012 NCS was quite similar in design to the 2014 NCS and achieved a similarly high response
rate and fairly representative sample. We received 1,606 responses in total in 2012, with 655 of these coming from
incumbents, 270 from non-incumbents who won and served in 2013, and 681 from non-incumbents who lost.
24This wording change should bias against our findings, however, as mentioning taxes in a question about universal
healthcare should make our estimate of public support for this policy more conservative. Consistent with this, other
national surveys with the question wording we presented on the NCS yield means that are even more supportive.
25A post-election survey in 2012 also found that these same misperceptions persisted after the election, suggesting
they are also not an artifact of the time of the electoral cycle at which we asked them.
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Table 3: Raw data estimates of politicians’ perceptions, true district opinion, and politicians’ mis-
perceptions, 2012 Pilot Study
Actual Public Elite Average
Issue Opinion Perception Misperception
2012 Politicians - Liberal Policies
Universal healthcare 57.29 43.45 -13.48***
(1.06) (0.57) (1.12)
Same-sex marriage 54.47 43.21 -11.26***
(1.15) (0.85) (1.15)
2012 Politicians - Conservative Policy
Abolish all fed. 9.44 31.90 22.04***
welfare programs (2.04) (0.63) (2.24)
*** = p < 0.001. ** = p < 0.01. * = p < 0.05. Notes: Standard errors are cluster bootstrapped
at the CCES respondent level for public opinion and at the district level for elite perceptions and
for misperceptions.
Robustness Across Legislators, States, and Voters
The conservative biases we uncovered in politicians’ perceptions of public opinion are robust
across statistical methods, weighting approaches, states, districts, years, issues, and reference pop-
ulations.
First, the results we presented above effectively used politicians as the unit of analysis, weight-
ing the misperceptions of those in small districts with few constituents just as much as those with
hundreds of thousands of constituents, like California State Senators. This raises the possibility that
our findings are driven by politicians who represent small districts. Column 1 of Table 4 shows the
main misperception results remain the same when the data is reweighted in the opposite manner,
such that all CCES respondents are weighted equally but politicians who represent larger districts
are weighted higher.
Other robustness checks are similarly encouraging. The next column of Table 4 shows the
results when we subset to states with highly professionalized legislatures only, as measured by
the Squire (2007) index of state legislative professionalism.26 The results look similar for the state
26We examine states where the Squire (2007) index is greater than 0.2. These are AK, AZ, CA, CO, FL, HI, IL, MA,
MI, NY, OH, PA, and WI.
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politicians whose campaigns and offices look much more similar to highly professionalized bodies.
Although whether our findings would generalize to Members of Congress is an open question, this
finding is provisionally encouraging. The next two columns of Table 4 show that the results also
remain unchanged when we examine only politicians who won (e.g., for the 2014 data, those who
were in office as of 2015) and when we examine incumbents only (e.g., for the 2014 data, those
who were in office in 2014 and seeking re-election).
The next to last column of Table 4 shows that the results also hold when we subset to only the
very most competitive districts in the sample using a stringent inclusion criteria: where Obama vote
share was between 45% and 55% in 2012. The standard errors increase because this is a smaller
subsample, but the point estimates remain similar.
In the last column of Table 4, we show that the results also hold when we compute public
opinion among CCES respondents who administrative records show voted in the 2014 election
and compare politicians’ perceptions of their districts to these voters’ opinion. We still find similar
overall results.
Partisan Asymmetries in EliteMisperceptions andMass Activism
When we examine the patterns of misperceptions by politicians’ party, it is clear that Repub-
lican politicians drive the bulk of the conservative-leaning misperceptions we found. Figure 4 and
Table 5 show that Republican politicians and Democratic politicians both overestimate their con-
stituents’ conservatism, but that Republican politicians do so to a much greater extent. Democrats
and Republicans both overestimate their constituents’ conservatism on every single issue, with the
one exception that Democrats very slightly underestimate support for the conservative birth con-
trol religious exemptions policy. Republicans overestimate support for the conservative position on
every issue by over 10 percentage points, and often by over 20 percentage points. Republicans also
overestimate conservatism more than Democrats every issue, often by over 10 percentage points
more.
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Table 4: Robustness of misperceptions across subsamples and approaches
Average Misperceptions
Professionalized Competitive 2014 Voter
Weighting to Legislatures Winners Incumbents Districts Opinion
Issue Constituents Only Only Only Only Only
2014 Politicians - Liberal Policies
Abortion always -10.0*** -11.6*** -9.3*** -9.5*** -8.5* -8.5***
legal (1.2) (1.8) (1.6) (1.8) (3.4) (1.5)
Ban assault -18.2*** -20.8*** -15.9*** -14.8*** -22.2*** -19.6***
rifles (1.3) (1.9) (1.6) (2.0) (2.7) (1.6)
Background checks -36.1*** -35.2*** -35.3*** -32.0*** -31.9*** -37.3***
for guns (1.5) (2.1) (1.7) (2.2) (3.8) (1.4)
Amnesty for -7.7*** -5.9** -8.2*** -5.4** -12.9*** -8.0***
undoc. immigrants (1.1) (2.1) (1.5) (1.7) (2.6) (1.4)
Same-sex -7.9*** -7.8*** -6.5*** -5.9*** -4.7 -6.1***
marriage (0.9) (1.4) (1.2) (1.4) (2.5) (1.1)
2012 Politicians - Liberal Policies
Universal -14.9*** -12.9*** -15.1*** -13.5*** -13.7*** -
healthcare (0.9) (1.3) (1.5) (1.6) (2.0)
Same-sex -12.3*** -11.4*** -9.7*** -9.2*** -10.7*** -
marriage (0.9) (1.4) (1.5) (1.7) (2.1)
2014 Politicians - Conservative Policies
Question suspected 11.7*** 11.4*** 12.4*** 11.3*** 13.7*** 9.5***
undoc. immig. (1.2) (2.0) (1.8) (2.3) (2.5) (1.6)
Birth control 1.5 1.2 4.8*** 3.2* 2.2 -0.3
religious exemptions (1.0) (1.6) (1.3) (1.5) (2.2) (1.2)
2012 Politicians - Conservative Policy
Abolish fed. 20.5*** 18.8*** 23.2*** 26.4*** 14.9*** -
welfare programs (2.0) (3.3) (2.8) (3.1) (4.4)
*** = p < 0.001. ** = p < 0.01. * = p < 0.05.
These differences are especially stark when examining the relationship between district opin-
ion and politicians’ perceptions visually with the aid of MRP. Figure 5 shows a version of Figure
3 with the results split by politicians’ party. For example, on the issue of same-sex marriage, con-
stituency support must be at roughly 55% before the majority of Democratic candidates believe
their constituencies barely favor same-sex marriage. Republicans, on the other hand, almost never
believe their constituents favor same-sex marriage; district support must be above 70% before they
think their constituents are barely in favor. Likewise, in districts where the public is evenly split
on same-sex marriage, the average Republican believes the public is opposed by nearly 3-to-1.
Such patterns seem likely to help explain the puzzle of why so many Republican politicians re-
main opposed to same-sex marriage even though their constituents favor it (e.g., Krimmel, Lax
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Figure 4: Partisan differences in misperceptions: raw data
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(b) 2012 Pilot Study
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Notes: The Figure shows our estimates of public support in the average district where an elite re-
sponded, in black, and the average political elites’ perception of support in those districts, in grey.
The subfigures are broken down by year, whether a “yes” on the issue is liberal or conservative,
and the party of the elite.
and Phillips 2016); Republicans do not appear to realize this is the case. Intriguingly, even though
the correlation between public opinion and perception of this opinion is similar for Republicans
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and Democrats, Republicans’ greater “intercept shift” means that they misperceive public opinion
far more.
Table 5: Partisan differences in misperceptions: raw data
Democratic Elites Republican Elites
Issue
Actual
Public
Opinion
Elite
Perception
Average
Misperception
Actual
Public
Opinion
Elite
Perception
Average
Misperception
2014 Politicians - Liberal Policies
Abortion always legal 56.29 50.66 -5.65*** 53.89 39.29 -14.56***
(1.39) (1.15) (1.55) (1.72) (1.24) (1.78)
Ban assault rifles 57.82 44.36 -13.36*** 56.97 30.71 -26.23***
(1.22) (1.27) (1.58) (1.67) (1.36) (1.95)
Background checks 84.71 52.67 -32.04*** 83.66 42.05 -41.58***
for guns (1.06) (1.32) (1.50) (1.60) (1.48) (2.04)
Amnesty for undoc. 46.85 40.95 -5.90*** 44.35 31.42 -12.93***
immigrants (1.28) (0.95) (1.23) (1.68) (1.24) (1.86)
Same-sex marriage 57.40 55.32 -2.09* 55.47 40.91 -14.54***
(0.93) (0.78) (0.98) (1.27) (0.89) (1.36)
2012 Politicians - Liberal Policies
Universal healthcare 59.60 52.24 -7.35*** 54.39 33.20 -21.19***
(1.38) (0.79) (1.47) (1.35) (0.88) (1.47)
Same-sex marriage 56.87 51.05 -5.82*** 51.31 32.89 -18.43***
(1.52) (0.99) (1.58) (1.38) (1.04) (1.51)
2014 Politicians - Conservative Policies
Question suspected 39.15 47.08 7.93*** 36.64 54.85 18.22***
undoc. immig. (1.43) (1.17) (1.59) (1.42) (1.55) (1.84)
Birth control 42.86 40.25 -2.53* 44.59 57.53 12.89***
religious exemptions (0.99) (0.72) (1.13) (1.28) (0.98) (1.57)
2012 Politicians - Conservative Policy
Abolish fed. 10.69 26.44 15.76*** 7.92 37.64 29.72***
welfare programs (2.43) (1.85) (2.28) (2.55) (2.48) (3.61)
*** = p < 0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05.
With this said, Figure 5 also rules two simple alternative explanations for our findings. First,
we can rule out the possibility that politicians simply will not admit to us that they are on the
wrong side of the median voter. In fact, on essentially every issue, we see that substantial num-
bers of politicians indicated to us that they believed their party’s position (which is nearly always
their own) is the minority position in the district — even in many cases where we are confident
the majority of voters actually do share their party’s view! Second, Democratic politicians also
overestimate constituency conservatism, which suggests these misperceptions cannot be attributed
to motivated reasoning or social desirability bias alone.
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Figure 5: Partisan differences in misperceptions: MRP
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As with our previous results, these partisan differences in misperceptions are robust when we
examine incumbents only, winners only, and weight to voters. The first two columns of Table 6
show that they are also robust in professionalized legislatures only. The next two columns show
that they also remain similar in the subset of very competitive districts where Obama received
between 45% and 55% of the two-party vote in 2012. This is a smaller subset of districts, and so
the standard errors increase, but the point estimates remain similar.
The final two columns of Table 6 present a result that bears special note: that the same partisan
difference in misperceptions also holds in just the subset of districts where we received responses
from both the Democratic and Republican candidate in a district. The standard errors are much
larger because this was a rare occurrence, but this allows us to hold constant public opinion and
show that Democrats and Republicans see the same constituents differently. This means we can
confidently reject the alternative explanation that politicians perceive opinion accurately but that
our estimates or inherent flaws in public opinion data in general (or the CCES in particular) are re-
sponsible for introducing bias; if two politicians perceive the same district differently, they cannot
both be right. Moreover, given the similar marginal distributions on the same issues on national
polls as on the CCES presented in Online Appendix E, it is highly likely that Democrats’ percep-
tions are more accurate.
Do Omitted Variables Drive Partisan Differences in Perceptions of Public
Opinion?
Are the partisan differences in the magnitude of politicians’ misperceptions driven by omit-
ted variables that correlate with party, rather than representing true partisan differences in how
Democrats and Republcians see their districts? As a reminder, the last columns of Table 6 showed
that our findings held when we compared pairs of politicians providing their perceptions of the
same districts, holding constant any confounders related to districts. With that said, there may be
other confoudners related to individuals. To examine these possibilities, we use a multivariate re-
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Table 6: Robustness of partisan difference in misperceptions
Average Misperception
Professionalized Legislatures Competitive Districts Both Parties Responded
Issue Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans
2014 Politicians - Liberal Policies
Abortion always -7.19** -17.36*** -3.18 -15.94** 1.12 -6.89
legal (2.21) (2.69) (3.68) (4.86) (5.81) (7.00)
Ban assault -16.77*** -26.50*** -19.99*** -25.06*** -10.54 -23.37***
rifles (2.40) (3.02) (3.46) (3.71) (6.62) (4.97)
Background checks -30.48*** -45.13*** -27.34*** -40.73*** -27.81** -39.39***
for guns (2.35) (3.34) (4.28) (4.73) (9.36) (7.58)
Amnesty for -2.79 -11.65* -9.80** -16.94*** -13.43*** -16.38**
undoc. immigrants (1.89) (4.58) (3.41) (3.88) (3.76) (5.21)
Same-sex -2.39 -17.00*** -0.20 -11.88** 2.96 -9.78**
marriage (1.48) (2.48) (2.24) (3.75) (3.04) (3.23)
2012 Politicians - Liberal Policies
Universal -7.20*** -22.12*** -20.23*** -7.20*** -5.52 -16.24***
healthcare (1.44) (2.07) (2.89) (1.44) (3.90) (3.62)
Same-sex -5.14*** -21.32*** -17.59*** -5.14*** -1.90 -17.56***
marriage (1.45) (1.92) (3.27) (1.45) (2.82) (3.88)
2014 Politicians - Conservative Policies
Question suspected 9.84*** 14.07*** 9.87*** 21.04*** 13.11 23.59***
undoc. immig. (2.72) (2.85) (2.71) (4.45) (7.17) (5.77)
Birth control -3.23 8.87** -3.51 11.25** -4.49 14.42***
religious exemptions (1.86) (2.72) (2.29) (3.57) (3.08) (3.14)
2012 Politicians - Conservative Policy
Abolish fed. 14.47*** 25.37*** 16.80* 14.47*** 24.28*** 31.78***
welfare programs (3.12) (5.99) (8.18) (3.12) (5.36) (6.06)
gression to estimate the relationship between the accuracy of politicians’ perceptions of public
opinion using party and several covariates based on other survey items from the NCS that might
be related to the accuracy of their perceptions. The outcome variable is specified as the politi-
cians’ mean absolute error, or the mean of the difference between their perceptions and the MRP
estimates. The results are summarized in Figure 6, in which all variables are scaled to standard
deviation one for comparability and higher values for the coefficients reflect more error in percep-
tions.
We find that errors in perceptions differ in predictable ways, but that by far the largest deter-
minant of misperceptions is that Republicans make much larger errors than Democrats do. Other
patterns include that politicians who already held office in 2014 and politicians in competitive
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Figure 6: Predictors of Errors in Perceptions
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elections both have slightly more accurate perceptions.27 Somewhat surprisingly, politicians who
report taking more polls were not significantly less error-prone.28 The partisan difference remains
robust in the presence of these covariates and remains clearly the largest estimate. For example,
Republicans’ greater inaccuracy is ten times larger than the average effect of being in a district one
full standard deviation more competitive.
Online Appendix F.3 also presents 95% credible intervals for the size of politicians’ errors
27That politicians who already hold office are more accurate may well be due to selection: presumably individuals
who are higher quality and more accurately perceive the public are more likely to win office in the first place. That
politicians are more accurate when they are running in competitive elections could reflect their greater incentives
to perceive the median voter, or that those in uncompetitive districts may spend comparatively more time with
copartisans and primary voters. Politicians running in states where the government was under unified Republican
control at the time of the 2014 election were also somewhat less accurate than politicians running in states with split
control or unified Democratic control. We find no significant differences between candidates who were running for
upper or lower houses of legislatures.
28The majority of politicians in the sample reported taking no polls.
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and their overestimation of conservatism by party; these intervals are similar in width to the 95%
confidence intervals of the raw data estimates above.
Potential Mechanism: Partisan Asymmetries in Contact and Activism
What accounts for this partisan asymmetry in misperceptions? As we have discussed, one po-
tential explanation for both parties’ misperceptions is that politicians’ information environments
are not representative of their districts (Fenno 1977; Miller and Stokes 1963). The citizens that
legislators and candidates meet are clearly not a representative sample: politicians may more fre-
quently come in contact with constituents who seek out contact with them, those constituents who
are identified as persuadable voters, and citizens who are more engaged in their communities.
What kind of citizens do politicians tend to come into contact with? As a proxy for the variety
of experiences politicians have where they may ascertain public opinion from who participates
in the public sphere, we examine who reaches out to politicians to express their views. Data on
contacting state-level politicians are rare, but some surveys have asked citizens about their patterns
of contacting Members of Congress. Consistent with other recent work on activism over the last
decade (Goss 2008; Schlozman, Verba and Brady 2012; Skocpol and Williamson 2011), these
surveys reveal an important asymmetry: Republican citizens are more likely to indicate they have
contacted their representatives than Democratic citizens are. In the 2012 ANES, Republicans were
28% more likely to say they had contacted their representatives than Democrats, and in the 2008
CCES Republicans were 39% more likely to have said they contacted their representatives than
Democrats.29 Taking these results at face value, even politicians in districts evenly divided across
partisan lines would hear disproportionately often from Republican constituents.30 For example,
contacting behavior among gun owners could help explain why politicians’ perceptions on that
issue are especially skewed: gun owners are nearly twice as likely to contact elected officials than
29Table A1 reports the point estimates for 2008 and 2012. It also shows that these same divergences did not exist in
the Presidential election year ANES surveys taken from 1980 to 1992.
30Unfortunately neither the CCES nor ANES asked about how many times an individual contacted their legislators’
office.
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the general public, whereas gun owners who are members of the NRA are nearly four times as
likely to do so.31
Not only are Republican citizens more likely to contact their representatives in general, but, as
a descriptive matter, Republican citizens reach out to Republican politicians especially often. Table
7a shows that, in districts represented by a Democratic Member of Congress (MC), Republicans
in the 2008 CCES were about 9% more likely to contact their MC than Democrats. However, in
districts with a Republican MC, Republicans were a full 41% more likely to contact their MC than
Democrats.32 Together, Republican citizens’ higher probability of contacting politicians in general
and their especially high likelihood of contacting fellow Republicans suggest two consequences:
Democratic politicians should hear from Republican constituents slightly disproportionately and
Republican politicians should hear from Republican constituents highly disproportionately. Table
7b illustrates this idea. The first row shows that if every citizen had contacted their US House
member, the CCES indicates Democratic US House members would receive 36% of their contacts
from Republicans while Republican US House members would receive 50% of their contacts from
Republicans; 36% of individuals who live in districts a Democrat represents are Republicans and
50% of individuals who live in districts a Republican represents are Republicans. However, the
contacting behavior we actually observe is skewed towards Republican constituents. A full 40%
of the CCES respondents in Democratic districts who said they contacted their legislator were
31Pew finds that “Gun owners are more likely than non-gun owners to have ever contacted a public official to express
their opinion on gun policy. About one-in-five gun owners (21%) say they have done this, compared with 12% of
non-gun owners.” See Pew, “America’s Complex Relationship With Guns.” Pew also finds that “46% of gun owners
in the NRA say they have contacted a public official to express their opinion on gun policy.” See Pew, “Among gun
owners, NRA members have a unique set of views and experiences.”
32 36.4% 33.3%
33.3% ⇡ 9%, 42.9% 30.4%30.4% ⇡ 41%. Our claim here does not depend upon a causal interpretation of this
descriptive difference between how Republicans behave in Democratic- and Republican-leaning districts; it may
simply be the case that Republicans are especially active in the kinds of districts where Republicans are elected for
some other reason than the party of their MC. This would still result in the consequence that Republican legislators
hear from Republican citizens especially often. With this said, Broockman and Ryan (2016) find that citizens tend to
prefer contacting legislators who share their partisanship and demonstrate this pattern with other forms of evidence
as well. It may be that there is a partisan asymmetry in the effects they documented, perhaps because of the greater
salience of partisanship as a social identity for Republican citizens. Consistent with a potential causal interpretation
of this difference, Online Appendix G conducts a formal regression discontinuity test that suggests at least some of
this pattern may be causal. Figure A4 shows a regression discontinuity plot with the outcome variable as the percent
of contacts that come from Republican citizens, and shows that there appears to be a discontinuous jump in this
quantity when a Republican just wins office.
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Republicans, versus 36% in the district at large, indicating a 12% over-representation of Republi-
cans among those who contact Democratic legislators. This disparity is even larger for Republican
legislators; 62% of the CCES respondents who said they contacted their legislators were Repub-
licans, even though only 50% of these legislators’ districts are Republicans on average, a 22%
over-representation.
Table 7: Democratic politicians hear from Republican citizens somewhat disproportionately, but
Republican politicians hear from Republican citizens especially disproportionately.
(a) Descriptive differences between self-reported contacting behavior of Democrats and Republicans in Democratic
and Republican districts.
% of Democrats
who contacted MC
% of Republicans
who contacted MC
Districts with Democratic MCs 33.3% 36.4%
Districts with Republican MCs 30.4% 42.9%
(b) Aggregate consequences of descriptive differences for who Members of Congress hear from.
Democratic US
House Members
Republican US
House Members
Percent of citizens
contacting who are
Republicans
Null: if every citizen
contacted their legislator 36% 50%
Observed: among citizens
who did contact their legislator 40% 62%
Over-representation of Republicans among citizens
who contact legislators 12% 22%
Source: Author’s analysis, 2008 CCES.
These patterns suggest a potential mechanism for the partisan asymmetry in conservative mis-
perceptions of public opinion we found in 2012 and 2014: the partisan asymmetry during these
years in who reaches out to which politicians. If these patterns were to generalize and politicians
were to heavily rely on who contacts themwhen forming their perceptions of public opinion (Miller
and Stokes 1963), then the patterns in Table 7 alone would generate the exact patterns of percep-
tions and misperceptions we found.
The Online Appendix presents additional tests of empirical implications of this mechanism
that provide further suggestive support for it. In Table A1 we find that this partisan difference
in contacting did not appear in comparable surveys in previous decades, and Online Appendix I
shows that the patterns of misperceptions we found do not appear in data on elites’ perceptions
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of public opinion other gathered in 1958, 1992, and 2000—although these earlier studies have
significant limitations. Although this historical data is more difficult to interpret, it is reassuring
that in historical periods when this mechanism did not appear to operate, its potential consequences
do not appear present.33 In addition, Online Appendix H shows suggestive evidence that in districts
and in states where we estimate that the Republican-leaning partisan imbalance in self-reported
contacting of legislators is greater, we find that politicians’ overestimation of conservatism is also
greater.34
With this said, as with all studies of causal mechanisms, this evidence must be regarded as ten-
tative. First, to be clear, our claim is not that contacts to legislative or campaign offices alone likely
explain all of politicians’ biased perceptions of public opinion. Rather, we see these questions
about contacting behavior as diagnostic of the broader set of activities intended to shape politi-
cians’ information environments. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any data on who contacts
or otherwise interacts with state legislative politicians, and so we cannot test this argument at the
individual level for our elite respondents to examine whether those respondents whose constituen-
cies display this tendency to a greater extent also have the greatest misperceptions. This would
represent an ambitious data gathering exercise, and we would urge future research to conduct it. At
the very least our research suggests the discipline’s surveys should include these questions more
regularly. With that said, these patterns are consistent with our broader theory that contemporary
33However, it does appear that there are several “intercept shifts” in how elites perceive opinion during these surveys,
consistent with our broader theoretical argument that systematic misperceptions are possible.
34Another potential empirical implication of this mechanism is that elected officials, who are receive more contact
from the public, would overestimate conservatism especially. Although we see contact as a proxy for a broader
suite of participatory behavior in the public sphere that could affect perceptions held by both elected officials and
candidates alike, we find some support for this hypothesis. It is the case that politicians are more accurate in general
than candidates, although we are not sure how to interpret this difference because politicians and candidates differ
in a host of pre-existing ways, including that they have been selected to some extent on the basis of their ability to
perceive what a constituency wants and are likely quality. With this said, we exploit the fact that our data on how
patterns of contacting politicians show an interaction of mass and elite party (i.e., that Republican citizens contact
Republican politicians especially often). As a result, we would predict a difference in the difference between the
accuracy of candidates and officeholders for Republicans and for Democrats. When we tested this prediction, we
found evidence for it. Specifically, running a regression of how much each respondent overestimates conservatism
on an indicator for holding office, an indicator for party, their interaction, and the same controls as in Figure 6
reveals a significant interaction, such that Republicans who hold office on average overestimate conservatism by 2.8
percentage points more than one would expect (t = 2.02, p < 0.05). That is, Republicans who hold office actually
overestimate conservatism by more than one would expect, which would be consistent with Republicans who hold
office being subject to particularly strong asymmetric contact from conservative constituents.
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American politicians—especially Republicans—work in information environments where conser-
vative views are overrepresented.
Discussion
On a broad set of controversial issues in contemporary American politics, US state political
elites in 2012 and 2014 believed that much more of the public in their constituencies preferred con-
servative policies than actually did. This pattern was present in two surveys of state legislators and
candidates. Elites’ partisanship was by far the most important determinant for the (in)accuracy of
their perceptions: Republicans were prone to severely overestimating support for conservative po-
sitions. Democrats’ perceptions also typically overestimated the public’s support for conservative
positions, although by less, suggesting our findings cannot be attributed to motivated reasoning by
Republicans alone. These findings suggest that misperceptions of public opinion may be an impor-
tant dynamic that contributes to dynamics such as asymmetric polarization, pushing Republicans
to the right and discouraging Democrats from making a similarly strong move leftward.
Theoretically, we argued that the presence of such large, systematic biases in politicians’ per-
ceptions of their geographic constituencies were possible and could contribute to significant bi-
ases in democratic representation. Several further testable implications of our argument also find
support in our data and others’. First, one implication of our argument is that relatively simple in-
formational interventions would lead to legislative outcomes that are more congruent with public
opinion. Indeed, in an ingenious experiment, Butler and Nickerson (2011) find that providing leg-
islators with information about public opinion in their districts causes them to cast more votes that
are congruent with their district’s median voter. Further field experiments of this type are a natural
next step for testing our theory. Our distinctive claim that politicians’ errors need not be symmetric
and random would predict, at least in 2012 and 2014, that treatment effects in such experiments
among Republicans in the US should be especially large—exactly as Butler and Nickerson (2011)
find. Further consistent with this expectation, although the observational nature of our data pro-
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hibits us from drawing firm causal conclusions, we also find that the politicians with the most
severe overestimation of conservatism told us they took the most extremely conservative positions
(see Table A2). A final testable implication of our empirical findings about the contemporary US
are that Republican politicians should be more likely to ideologically “overreach,” facing larger
penalties in general elections for being more extreme, as we expect they are more likely to misper-
ceive the median voter’s preferences and thus be more distant from the median to begin with.35 In
a recent article, Hall (2015) finds exactly this heterogeneity in the effects of additional ideological
extremism by party (see Hall 2015, Table A.4).
Hall’s (2015) result also suggests our findings about partisan differences are unlikely to be
driven entirely by Republican politicians having private information about ‘real’ opinion not re-
flected in public opinion surveys, as it appears Republicans are losing votes for taking the increas-
ingly conservative positions they are. Our finding that Democrats and Republicans perceive the
same districts differently further reinforces this point; if two politicians perceive the same district
differently, they cannot both be right. With this said, electoral incentives are clearly more com-
plex than the simple median voter theorem would imply. More generally, as with any single study,
we do not pretend that ours can definitively explain a complex phenomenon like asymmetric po-
larization in its totality. Rather, our evidence joins other work that tests predictions of significant
theories of polarization (e.g., Grossmann and Hopkins 2016; Noel 2012; Thomsen 2014), which
can comfortably coexist with and complement our own.
Our findings should open up new research agendas with the potential to deepen our understand-
ing of democratic representation and competition in a variety of ways. For example, our findings
that politicians misperceive public opinion could also prove relevant to understanding why politi-
cians appear differentially responsive to different groups within the public. Considerable evidence
suggests that American lawmakers are differentially responsive to different groups in the popula-
tion, including to those high in income (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2012; Gilens and Page 2014; Lax,
Phillips and Zelizer 2017), co-partisans, and primary voters (Hill 2017; Kastellec et al. 2015).
35This logic follows from the typical assumption of quadratic utility loss in spatial voting models.
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Politicians behave as if these subconstituencies and other issue publics exist (Fenno 1977), and
a natural next step for future research would be to measure how politicians perceive the size and
composition of such groups. To what extent do legislators consciously respond only to certain parts
of their constituencies, or to what extent do they try to represent everyone equally but perceive their
district in a biased way?36 Future work can and should build on ours to answer these questions,
which recent advances in estimation of public opinion among subconstituencies should facilitate
(Caughey and Warshaw 2016; Kastellec et al. 2015; Lax, Phillips and Zelizer 2017). Future work
should also expand the number and type of issues examined, especially to consider more eco-
nomic issues. It should also seek to query these perceptions at the Congressional level, if possible.
Members of Congress may well be different due to their differing resources and incentives. Al-
though the presence of asymmetric misperceptions in state legislatures with high professionalism
is encouraging, data on Congresspeople themselves would clearly be welcome.
More broadly, reviving a once-widespread interest in how politicians perceive public opinion,
our results should also open up a research agenda into better understanding what gives rise to these
misperceptions. One possibility our data suggest is that these misperceptions originate from pat-
terns of mass participation in the public sphere; consistent with this, Online Appendix H shows
suggestive evidence that politicians overestimated conservatism the most in districts where Re-
publicans were especially likely to contact legislators. However, other dynamics may reinforce
these misperceptions as well. For example, party activists are not equally polarized in both par-
ties: Republican party activists harbor more consistently conservative views than do Democratic
activists harbor consistently liberal views (Grossmann and Hopkins 2015, 2016; Layman et al.
2010; Lelkes and Sniderman 2016). If politicians look to copartisans to form their perceptions of
their districts, Republican politicians are thus likely to come in contact with an especially polarized
group of voters relative to Democrats, potentially distorting Republicans’ views of public opinion
more generally. Another possibility future research could address is whether politicians more ac-
curately perceive the public at the level of symbolic instead of operational ideology (Grossmann
36For example, one pattern that could drive our findings is if politicians are more likely to bring copartisans to mind
when they think about their district as a whole (Miler 2010).
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and Hopkins 2016). It also remains to be seen whether ‘thermostatic’ (Wlezien 1995) responses to
unified Republican government under Donald Trump will shift patterns in public participation in
a manner that might shift politicians’ perceptions of the public, especially on issues where liberals
are most vocal—a possibility we readily allow and that could provide additional tests of our theory
that mass participation influences politicians’ perceptions. We do not expect that the conservative
bias we observed in 2012 and 2014 to be a permanent feature of politics (and indeed we show
in Online Appendix I that these same misperceptions do not appear to have been present in ear-
lier eras, when, potentially relatedly, Democratic and Republican citizens contacted politicians at
similar rates; see Table A1).
Another research agenda our work should open up is understanding the consequences of these
misperceptions. Table A2 finds, unsurprisingly, that even within party politicians who misperceive
the public as more conservative by a greater amount are also more conservative in their positions.
However, the direction of causality here is obviously unclear. With this said, it is clear how our
findings may contribute to a phenomena like asymmetric polarization, which has produced pat-
terns like one Ahler and Broockman (2017) document: on average, Democratic politicians are
much more likely to vote congruently with constituent opinion than are Republicans. How these
misperceptions will influence policy outcomes is less clear, as politicians are embedded in institu-
tions that constrain their behavior. For example, Hall (2015) finds that when Republican candidates
for office take positions farther to the right, policy actually moves left as a consequence, because
Democrats become so much more likely to win office instead. In some cases, it could even be that
elites’ conservative misperceptions actually undermine conservative policy goals. Of course, these
misperceptions may also contribute to the conservative bias that exists in state policymaking in
some domains.37
37On issues of gay rights, for example, when it comes to state policies, “most noncongruence is in the conservative
direction” (Lax and Phillips 2009a, p., 383). The same conservative bias operates on votes on gay rights legislation
in Congress, where “74 percent of votes are incongruent in a conservative direction” (Krimmel, Lax and Phillips
2016). Whether these conservative biases are typically present in other domains is less clear. On the issues they
examine, Lax and Phillips (2012) find that policies are somewhat more likely to be incongruent in a conservative
than a liberal direction on average, but that the best characterization of the evidence is that liberal states are more
likely to be incongruent in a liberal direction and conservative states incongruent in a conservative direction.
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In terms of immediate implications for theories of democratic representation, our findings
present a mixed verdict. On the one hand, we found very strong responsiveness of politicians’
perceptions of public opinion to the reality of that opinion (e.g., Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson
2002)—much stronger than Miller and Stokes (1963). When comparing two districts with differ-
ing levels of support for a policy, it is usually the case that the politicians in the more supportive
district perceive higher levels of district support than do politicians in the less supportive district.
At the same time, our findings vividly illustrate how this strong responsiveness to public opin-
ion can belie imperfect congruence with it (Achen 1978; Lax and Phillips 2012). Although the
correlation between opinion and perception of opinion is strong, we found that it is frequently off-
set by an “intercept shift” that leads politicians to misperceive opinion across the board, sometimes
dramatically. The result is that policies with majority support in a majority of districts are often
seen as having that majority support by only a minority of legislators. These patterns of strong
responsiveness yet imperfect congruence are consistent with a more nuanced understanding of
how opinion translates into policy than the simple extremes that politicians care only about public
opinion or care about it not at all (Lax and Phillips 2012).
With this said, to the extent our findings are relevant to understanding why politicians do not
always represent their constituents perfectly, a degree of optimism seems warranted. Politicians’
incentives are difficult to change, but their information environments are demonstrably malleable
(Bendor and Bullock 2008; Butler and Nickerson 2011). For example, field experiments find that
even a few phone calls or emails from constituents can change legislators’ votes (Bergan 2009;
Bergan and Cole 2015). This suggests that any biases in representation that may result from mis-
perceptions of public opinion could be feasible to correct. Further observation of what happens
when politicians are confronted with more reliable information on public opinion (e.g., Butler and
Nickerson 2011) could thus prove both substantively impactful and theoretically illuminating.
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